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Abstract
This paper scrutinises the tenability of a strict conceptual distinction be-
tween space(time) and matter via the lens of the debate between modified
gravity and dark matter. In particular, we consider Berezhiani and Khoury’s
novel ‘superfluid dark matter theory’ (SFDM) as a case study. Two families
of criteria for being matter and being spacetime, respectively, are extracted
from the literature. Evaluation of the new scalar field postulated by SFDM
according to these criteria reveals that it is as much (dark) matter as anything
could possibly be, but also—below the critical temperature for superfluidity—
as much (of a modification of) spacetime as anything could possibly be. A
sequel paper examines possible interpretations of SFDM in light of this result,
as well as the consequences for our understanding of (the importance of) the
modified gravity/ dark matter distinction and the broader spacetime–matter
distinction.
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1 Introduction
If one goes to almost any talk directed at a general audience concerned with
cosmology and astrophysics, the speaker is likely to declare that one of the
biggest mysteries of contemporary physics is that only 4 or 5% of the matter
in the universe is ‘normal’ matter, the luminous matter we see all around us,
21-25% is dark matter and the rest is dark energy. Let’s bracket the question
of whether dark energy really belongs into that list, and whether it really
is energy in the sense in which both normal and dark matter posses energy.
What, one might ask, has led to the conviction that there is roughly 5 times
as much dark matter in the universe as the kind of matter we see all around
us, especially given that we have neither directly detected nor produced a dark
matter particle on the Earth? Why do we believe in the existence of dark
matter?
Well, the truth is that not everybody does. There is a much smaller com-
munity of physicists that see themselves in direct opposition to the dark matter
cartel. They say that it would be too hasty to conclude that dark matter ex-
ists, that indeed the observational data that has led the majority of physicists
to this conviction could be accounted for equally well, if not better, by sticking
to the belief that the majority of matter in the universe is luminous baryonic
matter, and by modifying instead the laws of gravity and spacetime physics.
True, members of this camp are less often invited to give public lectures to
a general audience. But they have produced impressive results, accounting
for the rotation curves of galaxies without the introduction of a new kind of
matter. Of course, this does not mean that they are right, either.
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The fact of the matter is that the conjunction of the assumptions i) Gen-
eral Relativity (GR), and Newtonian Gravity as its non-relativistic limit, is the
correct theory of gravity (and spacetime) and ii) most1 of the matter in the
universe is luminous baryonic matter (the stuff that stars and planets consist
of), leads to predictions that have been falsified by observations [1, 2]. We
will call these observations ‘dark phenomena’ or ‘dark discrepancies’.2 These
discrepancies show up at a large range of scales. Starting with the smallest
scale: Galaxy rotation curves—orbital speeds of visible stars or gas vs. radial
distance from the galactic centre—are expected to decline towards the edge
of the galaxy, but remain constant. Whole galaxies move faster than is to
be expected from the gravitational pull of the galaxy cluster that they are
part of. Gravitational lensing of either galaxies or galaxy clusters indicates a
stronger bending of light than expected from the mass of the luminous matter.
Finally, problems appear even at the cosmological scale. Density fluctuations
of luminous matter in the early universe are washed out as long as that mat-
ter is in thermal equilibrium with photons. Only after freeze-out can density
fluctuations grow under the influence of gravity, suggesting that structure for-
mation should not have progressed as much as we do in fact observe it to have
progressed at current times.
Essentially, the difference between the Dark Matter (DM) community and
the Modified Gravity3 (MG) community is that, in response to these discrep-
ancies, the former gives up premise ii) and introduces dark matter as the main
kind of matter in the universe, whereas the latter gives up on premise i) and
introduces different gravitational field equations.
On galactic scales, using GR over its Newtonian limit likely makes no ob-
servable difference for the predictions concerning rotation curves. Thus, the
first proposal of the MG community consisted of a modification of the New-
tonian gravitational equations, in the form of Mordehai Milgrom’s Modified
Newtonian Dynamics (MOND). One way of presenting the theory is as a mod-
ification of Newton’s inverse square law of gravity, which is replaced by:
FG = G
Mm
µ( aa0 )r
2
{
µ ≈ 1, if a≫ a0 (1)
µ ≈ a/a0, if a≪ a0 (2)
where a0 is a new constant of nature, which has been empirically determined to
be 1.2× 10−10ms2 [3, 4]. This law approximates Newton’s law for gravitational
accelerations much larger than a0. However, at accelerations much smaller
than a0 the gravitational force is enhanced in comparison to Newton’s law. It
follows that there is no practical difference for the planets in our solar system,
1Except for, e.g. Standard Model neutrinos, but we know that their masses and cosmic densities
are not sufficient to account for what we below call the ‘dark phenomena’.
2Many in the literature speak of the ‘missing mass problem’, but we chose not to follow this
terminology because it seems to presuppose (rather than to argue) that premise ii) above is wrong.
3The common terminology ‘modified gravity’ is unfortunate in our context, in that one of the
things at stake here is exactly whether the gravitational field (in relativistic theories) is to be
classified as part of the matter or part of the spacetime sector—if such a classification is possible
in the first place. Nevertheless, we will in the first instance adopt the standard terminology, rather
than, for instance, ‘modified spacetime’.
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but there is for stars in the outer regions of their galaxy. Once this value for
a0 is obtained, MOND uniquely and adequately predicts the observed galaxy
rotation curves.
As noted above, MOND described thus seems a clear example of an MG
theory, which modifies premise i) while leaving premise ii) untouched.
Likewise, paradigmatic DM theories can easily be introduced within the
Newtonian regime. Choosing (by hand) a suitable distribution of additional,
electrically neutral, massive Newtonian objects obeying the (unmodified) laws
of Newtonian Gravity can also account for the observed rotation curves of
individual galaxies.
At the very least at the cosmological scale, and in the context of gravi-
tational lensing also at the level of galaxies and galaxy clusters, we have to
move beyond (modified or unmodified) Newtonian physics and use a relativis-
tic theory—and sometimes also a quantum theory—that is approximated by
(modified or unmodified) Newtonian gravity at low velocities and for weak
gravitational fields [5]. The question that we want to address in this paper
is whether a clear distinction remains between modifying the gravitational in-
teraction/ spacetime structure (premise i) on the one hand and modifying the
assumption of what the matter content in our universe consists of (premise ii).
In other words: once we enter the relativistic (and quantum) regime, is there
still a clear distinction between gravitational fields and matter fields?
This distinction between gravity/spacetime and matter has been questioned
already in the context of classical GR,4 nevermind dark phenomena. For in-
stance,5 Earman and Norton argued that the metric field in GR, the successor
of the Newtonian gravitational potential in the context of GR, should be seen
as belonging to the same ontological category as what represents matter in
the context of GR: both are fields defined on the spacetime manifold M [19].6
Earman and Norton took inspiration directly from Einstein, who did not see
the metric field as categorically different from the electromagnetic field, or
indeed any other fields, and staunchly argued that the claim that GR had
‘geometrized’ the gravitational field (but not yet the electromagnetic field)
did not have any meaning at all [22]. Similarly, Rynasiewicz argued that the
old debate between substantivalism and relationalism (the question of whether
space or spacetime is a fundamental entity in its own right or derivative of
the relationships between material bodies) is ill-founded in the context of GR,
primarily because it is just not clear that the metric field gµν should be seen
as corresponding to (aspects of) spacetime (structure) [6]. In a similar vein,
one of us has argued that the property that makes a field a matter field in
4Skepticism about the space(time)–matter distinction may be traced back even further. Around
the very end of the 19th century, it was widely held that “the question whether the aether is really
a special form of matter or really just space endowed with certain physical properties is not one of
serious consequence, but only a question of what mode of expression one prefers to adopt” [6, p.290].
Of course the concept of the aether, at least in any of its historical forms, has long been abandoned,
but one might wonder—as Rynasiewicz does, and we will do, in the main text—to what extent
the (manifold plus) metric field in GR is not a new aether in disguise, in the sense of having both
properties that are historically associated with matter and with spacetime.
5See also [7–14] [15, p.354] [16, p.36] [17, §3.3] [18, §8].
6See also [8,20] [21, Ch.9].
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the context of relativistic field theories is that it has a mass-energy-momentum
tensor Tµν asssociated with it, but that the definition of this matter-making
property definitionally depends on gµν in a variety of ways [23]. This, too,
suggests that the line between ‘matter’ and ‘gravity / spacetime structure’ is
not as sharp as has often been claimed.7
Finally, of course, the distinction also comes under fire in various ap-
proaches to solving the problem of quantum gravity.8 However, in this paper
we are interested in the degree to which this distinction becomes problematic
even before reaching the regime were such theories of quantum gravity9 are
expected to reign—this has the additional benefit of staying closer to experi-
ment/observation.
In these two companion papers, we shall provide a new argument against
the idea that in relativistic and/or quantum theories the distinction between
matter and spacetime, and related to that the distinction between modify-
ing the matter content or modifying the gravitational laws, is clear-cut. We
shall question the tenability of the spacetime/matter distinction by scruti-
nising it through the lens of the modified gravity/ dark matter distinction
(MG/DM)10—which is, in some senses, more clear, more straightforward than
the GR lens. This is one of many possible ways in which to make a small contri-
bution to the ‘cartography research programme’. This research programme is
concerned with navigating the space of theories via a dynamic back-and-forth
between, on the one hand, understanding and interpreting individual theories
and, importantly, the relations between neighbouring theories and the con-
cepts they use, and, on the other hand, exploring the larger space of theories
(with the help of the lessons learnt from the individual case studies) in order
to understand that space as a whole and to streamline theory generation.11
(More on this in the sequel paper [24].)
Deflating the strict dichotomy or even the distinction between dark matter
theories and modified gravity theories might contribute to undermining the
7We will return to the question of whether ‘possessing’ mass-energy-momentum is the right
criterion for defining ‘matter’ in section 2.2.
8A particularly interesting context would be string theory: is the dilaton best categorised as
spacetime, matter, both or neither? We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this
suggestion.
9Although the case study in this paper, superfluid dark matter theory, is a theory of quantum
gravity in the sense that a (macroscopic) quantum effect, namely a superfluid Bose-Einstein con-
densate, leads to a modification of gravity (at the scale of galaxies), it is not a theory of quantum
gravity in the sense of solving the problem of quantum gravity (which concerns a regime that is
not standardly associated with the galactic scale).
10Other interesting pre-quantum-gravity contexts in which one can question the tenability of
the spacetime/matter distinction—thereby further contributing to the cartography research pro-
gramme (see main text and [24])—include spin-2 gravity, Newton-Cartan theory, f(R) gravity and
Jordan-Brans-Dicke theories [25], the cosmological constant, black holes, unified field theories and
supersymmetric theories.
11These companion papers thereby cohere with an argument by one of us that (even) if one (only)
wants to understand and interpret a (single) theory, in particular our ‘best’ spacetime theory, GR,
and figure out what makes it special, one (still) needs to look at the neighbourhood of that theory
in the space of spacetime theories. See [26] for details, and for a strategy in a similar spirit see [27].
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mutual hostility that is prevalent between the two camps that have formed in
response to one of modern physics’ most pressing problems: the dark discrep-
ancies. Deflating the broader distinction between spacetime and matter could,
quite literally, make the oldest foundations of natural philosophy crumble, in-
cluding the debate that has dominated the philosophy of space(time) over the
past three centuries: the substantivalism/relationalism debate.12
We will go about this by investigating a particularly promising theory due
to Lasha Berezhiani and Justin Khoury [29,30].13 They call it “superfluid dark
matter theory”; we shall call it SFDM in the following. Their theory comes as a
response to the stalemate between the DM and the MG research programmes—
DM theories have traditionally done well at the level of cosmology and galaxy
clusters, but less so at the level of galaxies,14 with the opposite being the
case for MG theories. Superfluid dark matter theory has gained quite some
attention in the physics community, particularly because it seems that given
SFDM you can have your cake and eat it: in their seminal paper of 2015, the
authors announce that SFDM “matches the successes of the Λ cold dark matter
(ΛCDM) model on cosmological scales while simultaneously reproducing the
modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND) phenomenology on galactic scales” [30,
p.1]. The way in which this is achieved is by introduction of a new self-
interacting, massive and complex scalar field Φ which the authors classify as
a dark matter field. However, Φ has two phases corresponding to the two
domains in which typical DM and MG theories are successful; galaxy clusters
and galaxies, respectively. On the length scale of galaxy clusters, Φ is in the
12A third option in addition to substantivalism and relationalism that is often swept under the
carpet is that of super-substantivalism. Where relationalism argues that space(time) is derivable
from matter, super-substantivalism argues that matter is derivable from space(time). However,
most versions of super-substantivalism do not thereby identify the two notions, ontologically, let
alone conceptually. Rynasiewicz argues that not even the arch-super-substantivalist Descartes’
definintion of matter as res extensa was intended to destroy the conceptual distinction [6, p.281-2].
Skow [28] and Lehmkuhl [16] distinguish modest and radical supersubstantivalism. The former is
the metaphysical view that, regardless of the specific physical theory (albeit most naturally in a
field theory [6, p.298-9]), one can simply stipulate that paradigmatic matter properties such as mass
and colour are all directly attributed to spacetime. The latter is the physics research programme
of determining to what extent specific physical theories, such as Kaluza-Klein theory or Wheeler’s
geometrodynamics, manage to reduce these apparent non-geometrical properties to (or have them
emerge from) geometrical (or topological) properties. In a sense this paper concerns something
even more radical: the research programme of determining to what extent the neighborhood of our
best theories in the space of theories suggests a conceptual identification, or at least a blurring, of
the orthodox distinction between spacetime and matter.
13For potential further interesting DM/MG case studies, see [31–43].
14This may seem to contradict our earlier claim that one can account for the observed rotation
curves of individual galaxies by a suitable distribution of dark Newtonian objects obeying the
(unmodified) laws of Newtonian gravity. It is indeed true that if one models the dark matter
distribution with sufficiently many parameters and adjusts them by hand for each individual galaxy,
that one can fit the observed rotation curve of that galaxy. However, if one does not put in each
galactic distribution by hand, but uses the output of computer simulations of the evolution of
the whole universe, one has trouble reproducing the correct locations, numbers and shapes of
dark matter halos, as well as several empirical correlations across galaxies, such as the baryonic
Tully-Fisher relation [44].
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normal fluid phase, giving rise to axion-like particles with masses in the range of
eVs and strong self-interactions. This allows for reproduction of the successes
of typical dark matter theories. On the length scale of single galaxies, Φ enters
a superfluid phase, giving rise to superfluid phonons that are governed by a
MOND-like action (in the non-relativistic regime). It is thus that they can
reproduce MOND phenomenology in galaxies. Borrowing terminology from an
approach of kindred spirit due to Sabine Hossenfelder [45], one might call Φ in
the superfluid phase an “imposter field”: a field that is ‘really’ dark matter,
but acts as if it was a modification of gravity, a new gravitational degree of
freedom, in a certain domain. (Interestingly, Hossenfelder refers to SFDM as a
variant of modified gravity. SFDM is formally very similar to her own covariant
version of Verlinde’s emergent/entropic gravity. She interprets the new field in
her own theory as a modification of gravity, with plays the role of dark matter
without ‘being’ dark matter. It is hence considered an imposter field (but in
the sense opposite to that above).)
The aim of this pair of companion papers will be to unpack and analyse
such interpretational claims. Is Φ ‘really’ a dark matter field and only acts
like a modification of gravity in certain regimes? Or should one say that it
is fundamentally a new gravitational field that acts like a dark matter field
in certain regimes? If not, why not? Or is the sense in which Φ is dark
matter on a par with the sense in which it is a modification of gravity and
spacetime? And indeed, what are the criteria that justify calling a scalar field
(and its excitations) a dark matter field in the first place, or a new gravitational
field / gravitational degree of freedom? Or does SFDM put pressure on the
contemporary usefulness or even the coherence of these old categories?
We will proceed in the following way. In this first paper, we will discuss the
criteria that might be put forward to categorise a newly introduced tensor (or
spinor) field as a matter field (section 2) or an aspect of spacetime (section 3),
respectively. In the latter case, we will focus on the question of what counts as
modifying the representation of gravitational fields as compared to GR, which
is typically the starting point of Modified Gravity approaches. Since in GR
the representation of gravity is based on pseudo-Riemannian geometry, many
modifications of GR are modifications of that underlying geometrical structure.
However, note that we do not thereby commit to the claim that every theory of
gravity will conceive of gravity as something necessarily connected to spacetime
geometry; indeed, this opinion is controversial even in the context of GR. In
short, some but not all theories of gravity are spacetime theories, just like some
but not all spacetime theories are theories of gravity. Still, within the realm of
modified gravity theories aiming to give an account of the dark discrepancies,
the decisive change as compared to GR is typically a geometrical one; as we
shall see, SFDM, by following a prominent relativistic extension of MOND
called TeVeS, involves the introduction of a second, ‘physical’ metric tensor,
and a coming apart of the different roles the metric tensor plays in GR.
Following the discussion of the criteria that might lead one to consider
a new field a matter field or a modification of spacetime and gravity (or a
new gravitational and/or spatiotemporal degree of freedom), we shall—after
introducing SFDM in more detail (section 4)—apply these criteria to the case
of SFDM (section 5). We shall argue that the often unquestioned assump-
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tion that every field is either a matter field or a gravitational/spacetime field
is put under severe pressure by SFDM. In particular, we will argue that the
newly introduced scalar field in SFDM is both a matter field and a gravita-
tional/spacetime field. This result will then be the starting point of the second
companion paper [24], where we will unpack the interpretational questions
raised above, both in the context of SFDM as well as in the broader context
of charting (the neighbourhood of SFDM in) the space of theories.
2 Matter Criteria
The first dominant family of criteria in the literature are often considered the
litmus test for calling something matter.15,16 Explicit discussions of a (natu-
ralistic) definition of matter (as opposed to spacetime) are surprisingly rare.
Interestingly, one of the clearest discussions of these criteria occurred when
Earman and Norton’s hole argument [19] lead to a discussion on the concept
of spacetime. The ensuing debate targeted a conception of substantival space-
time that excluded the metric field:
Norton and Earman provide several considerations designed to pro-
mote the bare manifold as the most plausible candidate for sub-
stantival space-time. The leading arguments are: a) In the GTR
[General Theory of Relativity] the metric field is just like any other
field, both mathematically and physically. It is represented by a
tensor similar to, e.g., the electromagnetic field; it is governed by
local differential equations; it carries energy and momentum. Hence
it should not be essential to space-time (Earman & Norton 1987,
p. 519). b) In the GTR the metric becomes a dynamical object.
Hence it should not be considered essential to space-time (Earman
forthcoming, chapter 10). [52, p.97]
This line of reasoning could be interpreted as the metric field being just like
any other matter field—which would make the mentioned properties aspects
of the definition of matter.17 Rovelli uses the term ‘matter’ explicitly:
[I]n the general relativistic world picture [the spacetime-versus-matter
distinction] collapses. In general relativity, the metric/gravitational
15Sometimes some of these criteria are used as criteria for being physical—for being real [46,
Chs.5,8] [47, §4.2] [48–50]—rather than (just) being matter. However, equating ‘matter’ and ‘phys-
icality’/‘reality’ would imply that spacetime must either be matter or it must be unphysical. We
take it that there is nothing unphysical about pure spacetime (i.e. something that is spacetime
but not simultaneously matter), such as Newtonian spacetime. We shouldn’t a priori rule out the
possibility of our world (or other worlds) containing pure, physical spacetime.
16Baker takes the negation of some of these criteria as counting toward an object satisfying the
spacetime concept [51].
17Another possible interpretation however, closer to Einstein (and arguably intended by Earman
and Norton), is that the metric field and paradigmatic ‘matter’ fields such as the electromagnetic
fields are all just fields, with the further distinction between matter fields and other fields being
unimportant, or even misleading. Einstein’s position on this will be spelt out and discussed in
detail in [53].
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field has acquired most, if not all, the attributes that have character-
ized matter (as opposed to spacetime) from Descartes to Feynman:
it satisfies differential equations, it carries energy and momentum,
and, in Leibnizian terms, it can act and also be acted upon, and so
on. [8, p.193]18
Let us pick these matter criteria, often put forward as necessary and/or
sufficient criteria for being matter, apart systematically, and order them ac-
cording to logical strength. Initially, their differences will be illustrated by
applying them, as in the above quotes, to the metric field in GR. In some cases
this application is controversial. We will see below that in the context of MG
and DM theories their application is more straightforward.
2.1 Kinetic (matter) criteria
The four weakest matter criteria might be dubbed the kinetic criteria. In order
of logical strength:
Matter criterion strength A: The object under consideration is not con-
stant/ static, but varies/ changes.19
Matter criterion strength B: The object under consideration changes in a
regular fashion.
Matter criterion strength C: The object under consideration changes in a
regular fashion that is describable by non-trivial differential equations.
Matter criterion strength D: The object under consideration changes in
a regular fashion. This change is (partially) in response to something
external, and (thus) describable in terms of coupled differential equations
that describe the coupling of the object to the external factor.
Newton’s absolute space has none of these properties; Newtonian matter—
such as planets and billiard balls—has all of them. Although the first criterion
is thus in principle sufficient to separate space(time) and matter in the New-
tonian framework (and also in special relativity), we will see below that New-
ton nevertheless had a much richer conception of matter. A Humean mosaic
with mass values randomly sprinkled on top would be of exactly strength A.
Non-trivial sourceless20 solutions to GR, such as those containing gravitational
waves, satisfy up to criterion C. Generic metrics with sources that are solutions
to GR satisfy all of the above criteria.
Criterion D is a strong version of what is often called the action-reaction
principle. Obeying a general action-reaction principle is logically speaking not
stronger than criterion B, if it is logically possible to regularly change due to
18See also [13].
19Within a model/possible world that is; we are not considering an inter-model/inter-world
comparison. Note that we do not insist on the variation being across time.
20These are often referred to as vacuum solutions, but the notion of vacuum becomes ambiguous
if the spacetime–matter distinction is ambiguous. What we are referring to is solutions with no
other non-zero fields besides the metric.
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something external without that implying that the change becomes describable
in terms of differential equations. However, such a possibility is not relevant
in the context of this paper.
In the context of criterion D, we could make the further distinction between
objects whose dynamics is totally determined by external factors, and those
which have their dynamics only partially determined externally, that is those
with partially internal dynamics. A special case of demanding total determina-
tion is Einstein’s 1918 version of Mach’s principle: the demand that the metric
field gµν be uniquely determined by the the mass-energy-momentum distribu-
tion of matter, Tµν [54]. This criterion was put under pressure in the debate
between Einstein and De Sitter following the discovery of the De Sitter solu-
tion to the Einstein field equations with cosmological constant in 1917 [55–57].
We now know that the metric field in general relativity is merely constrained
rather than determined by matter.21 Hence, the set of solutions to the Einstein
equations satisfying exactly up to criterion C is the set of sourceless solutions;
the same can be said for other field equations in which the gravitational field
(in the case of GR the metric gµν) has independent degrees of freedom. Hav-
ing independent degrees of freedom is, however, not a necessary condition for
being matter in any of these four senses.
2.2 Energetic (matter) criteria
The next three stronger criteria may be called the energetic criteria. They
require the object under consideration to carry energy22,23 [48], a concept
that can be cashed out in three distinct ways. In order of logical strength:
Matter criterion strength E–G: The object under consideration changes
in a regular fashion. This change is (partially) in response to something
external, and (thus) describable in terms of coupled differential equations,
in such a way that the object can be said to carry exchangeable ‘energy’
(and momentum)
(E) ascribable to a particular spacetime volume;
(F) ascribable to each point in spacetime;
(G) representable by a stress-energy tensor, Tµν .
21This becomes particularly clear from the decomposition of the Riemann curvature tensor into
terms featuring only the Ricci tensor and terms featuring only the Weyl tensor. Only Ricci cur-
vature is determined by the Einstein equations; the Weyl tensor encodes the free gravitational
degrees of freedom—they are constrained but not fixed by the Einstein equations.
22We thus strongly disagree with Bunge, who equates energy to changeability and thereby con-
flates matter criteria A through G [48].
23Why is energy more relevant than, say, entropy? At least within thermodynamics it does
not seem to be more special. It would be interesting to consider whether carrying entropy is
in any way an indicator of being matter. If carrying entropy is considered necessary for being
matter, one consequence would be that (the superfluid component of the two-fluid model of)
perfect superfluids, such as those appearing in SFDM, would not count as matter. (The two-fluid
model will be discussed in the second companion paper [24].)
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Criterion E insists on the energy being exchangeable, that is it ‘interacts’
with some measurement apparatus whenever the required matter for such ap-
paratus is present.24 After all, it might seem conceivable that an object has
(non-exchangeable) energy, without satisfying criterion D—being influencable
by external objects—and even its converse—being able to influence external
objects. To make it crystal clear that criterion E is strictly stronger than D
we insist on the energy being exchangeable.25
Being kinetical (in any of the senses of criteria A–D) means that some-
thing is changing. Changing often means changing with respect to spacetime,
in which case kinetic energy is indeed definable (relative to a frame), and if
there is an action-reaction principle with (other) matter then this energy is
exchangeable. Doesn’t criterion D imply E and F and perhaps even G? Are
they truly distinct—extensionally, or at the very least intensionally? Well, in
GR the metric field, often taken to represent spacetime, is itself dynamical,
which makes it less clear if and how energy is involved. What we can definitely
say, in the restricted context of GR, is that criterion G is not satisfied by the
metric, since gravitational energy is represented by a pseudo-tensor, rather
than a tensor (and thus, a fortiori, not by a stress-energy tensor Tµν). For
Hoefer [58] and Du¨rr [59, 60] this implies that criteria E and F are also not
satisified by the metric. Hoefer believes that the concepts of carrying energy
and energy being representable by a stress-energy tensor do not come apart26
(hence the quotation marks around ‘energy’ in criterion E and F):
I am inclined to believe ... that gravitational waves do not in fact
carry substantival energy content. ... [T]he fact that gravitational
energy must be represented by a pseudo-tensor (and that no one
pseudo-tensor has a privileged status for this representation) are the
reasons for denying that gravitational energy is truly substantial.
[58, p.13; italics in original]27
This implication goes against a long tradition of taking gravitational waves
(GWs) to carry energy (despite this energy not being represented by a tensor),
whether at each point or only in each finite region. This tradition started with
Einstein’s first derivation of gravitational waves in the linearized limit [63,64],
and was continued with Feynman and Bondi’s sticky bead thought experiment
24 Here we assume that measurement apparatus must be made of matter. This assumption is of
course questionable in light of the general thesis of this paper, and also, more specifically, in the
context of attempts to reduce supposed matter to (or unify it with) spacetime.
25One might counter that this situation is not coherently conceivable, because such non-
exchangeable energy would have no operational meaning and thereby not really any meaning
whatsoever. Adding the qualifier ‘exchangeable’ would thus be a pleonasm; no information is
added. Such reasoning would open the door to finding the first three criteria meaningless as well.
We will thus assume for now that the notions of change and energy still have some technical, if not
operational, meaning in these situations. After all, as noted in fn. 24, the notion of ‘operational’
may have to be rethought anyway if the spacetime–matter distinction becomes ill-defined.
26Du¨rr is more liberal, in that he allows all so-called ‘geometric objects’ to potentially represent
energy, even non-tensorial geometric objects. Pseudo-tensors are however not geometric objects in
his sense [60].
27See also Hoefer’s 2000 paper [61] and [62].
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designed to show that GWs can heat up matter [65]. Subsequent advocates
often invoke binary systems of which the orbital decay is claimed to be best
explained by the system’s energy and momentum being carried away by GWs.
The tradition is perhaps most dramatically proclaimed by Rovelli, who does
not only suggest that this carrying of energy puts the metric field on a par
with the electromagnetic field, but that this shatters the spacetime–matter
distinction altogether:
Let me put it pictorially. A strong burst of gravitational waves
could come from the sky and knock down the rock of Gibraltar,
precisely as a strong burst of electromagnetic radiation could. Why
is the first “matter” and the second “space”? Why should we regard
the second burst as ontologically different from the second? Clearly
the distinction can now be seen as ill-founded. [8, p.193]
Read argues, against Hoefer and Du¨rr, that under certain assumptions and on
a functional understanding of energy, there exist solutions to GR in which the
metric can be attributed gravitational stress-energy (represented by a pseudo-
tensor), albeit only in finite regions, not at a point (i.e., criterion E but not F
is satisfied) [66].28
We will not attempt to settle this debate here. That the issues of GWs
carrying energy and there being any substantial notion of gravitational energy
in GR are controversial is sufficient reason to, at least prima facie, separate
criterion E and F from G, and D from E and F, and entertain the possibility
that GR may contain solutions that satisfy up to criterion D only as well as
solutions that satisfy up to criterion E or F.
The final criterion perhaps does not deserve to be called a matter criterion,
but it follows neatly in the hierarchy, and will become important when applying
the matter criteria to SFDM:
Matter criterion strength H: The object under consideration changes in
a regular fashion. This change is (partially) in response to something
external, and (thus) describable in terms of coupled differential equations,
in such a way that the object can be said to carry exchangeable energy
(and momentum) representable by a stress-energy tensor, Tµν , part of
which is due to the rest mass of the object.29 In other words: the object
is massive.
The tradition of considering ‘having mass’ to be the litmus test for mat-
ter started with Newton in his Principia, where he takes mass (arrived at via
28The modern debate could profit from a more detailed study of the original debate on the
nature of gravitational energy and the role of tensorial vs. pseudo-tensorial objects; see section
II of Volume 7 and section VIII of Volume 8 of the Collected Papers of Albert Einstein for an
overview, and [53] for analysis of and connections between the positions advocated by Einstein,
Lorentz, Klein, Schro¨edinger and Levi-Civita on these questions, as well as a discussion of how
their insights could be used in the context of the modern debate.
29Note that this criterion is fulfilled by the relativistic fluids but not by electromagnetic fields.
For the trace of the energy-momentum tensor of the former does not vanish (and thus allows for
a rest frame and for the possession of rest mass), while the energy-momentum tensor of the latter
vanishes: the continuum counterpart of the principle of the constancy of the speed of light.
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mass density times volume) to be the quantity of matter [67, p.1] [68]. This
tradition was embraced by Maxwell, Kelvin, Tait and Clifford [69], and was
still influential in the 1920s when the aether was judged not to be matter ex-
actly because it lacked rest mass. In Newtonian times such a criterion made
perfect sense, as all well-understood (particle) matter had mass. In light of the
current standard model of particle physics, and especially the existence of the
massless photon,30 one may of course ask why mass would be so special. Why
not consider spin, or isospin, or any other quantum number to be the essence
of matter?31 Or, more generally, a disjunction of all of the above? Alterna-
tively one may simply consider matter criterion G, at most, to be sufficient for
something to be matter; any stronger condition is asking too much.
3 Spacetime criteria
The philosophical literature contains a second major family of criteria associ-
ated with the spacetime–matter distinction. We will refer to this family as the
set of spacetime criteria. They are usually proferred as necessary and/or suffi-
cient criteria for something to be spacetime or an aspect of spacetime structure
in the subtantivalism–relationalism debate.
Both substantivalism and relationalism are realist positions about space(time),
they merely differ on the relative fundamentality of space(time) and spati(otempor)al
relations between material objects. Within the context of the modern substantivalism–
relationalism debate one needs to consider two issues:
i) the core issue: whether spacetime and matter are separate fundamental
entities (substances) or whether spacetime is derivable from matter in
some sense (for example from the relationships between material bodies).
This part of the debate is the direct continuation of the debate between
Leibniz and Clarke in the context of pre-relativistic mechanics.
ii) the prior issue of fixing the referents of the terms in the core issue, in par-
ticular what the referent of the term ‘spacetime’ is in GR. The main candi-
dates in the philosophical literature on the substantivalism–relationalism
debate are a) the manifoldM by itself, b) the manifoldM and the metric
field gµν together, c) the metric field gµν by itself [19, 58, 70].
Only the second issue matters to us in the context of this paper, or rather
the connected question of what is a lower bound, a minimal set of properties
for something to count as spacetime or as an aspect of spacetime structure. In
the following we will consider some candidate criteria for calling something a
spacetime. It will be important to keep two things in mind.32
30In fact, many particles within the standard model are not always massive; they only become
massive via the Higgs mechanism once the electroweak symmetry spontaneously breaks in the early
universe.
31We would like to thank Radin Dardashti for this point.
32Both of these caveats cohere with Baker’s understanding of the notion of spacetime as a cluster
concept [51], with which we sympathise to some extent. A cluster concept is a way of making
precise how certain properties can count toward the application of the concept being appropriate.
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Firstly, the list of three structures discussed in the philosophical literature
(issue ii) is too limited for the space of theories we envisage, although this is
perhaps not surprising given that the philosophical debate presupposed GR.
The physics literature considers a much larger variety of possibilities, see for
instance Sharpe [71], Vizgin [72], Goenner [73] and Blagojevic´ & Hehl [74]. In
the following, we will go slightly beyond these three structures, but will still
fall short of considering the full range. Instead, we will stay close to general
relativity and consider one set of (many possible sets of) criteria that are jointly
sufficient for something to be spacetime, namely the set that is relevant to the
case study at hand. Note that we are thus not claiming that these criteria are
necessary for being spacetime33—as in fact we do not think they are, although
we do believe that many of these criteria are typically fulfilled by spacetimes.
Defining spacetime exhaustively in the context of the full space of theories will
require going beyond this set of criteria.
Secondly, although some of these criteria are logically stronger or weaker
than others, others are logically independent of each other. Hence, we will not
label them alphabetically as we did to indicate the total logical ordering of the
matter criteria.
3.1 Mathematical (spacetime) criteria
A first subset of the spacetime criteria might be called the structural [76] or
abstract or mathematical criteria. A first candidate is as follows:
Spacetime criterion M: The object under consideration is (faithfully rep-
resentable by) a differentiable manifold, i.e. a (topological) manifold plus
differentiable structure.
Leibnizian spacetime [77, p.30–31] satisfies this criterion. However, New-
ton’s bucket experiment is designed to show that we need a way of distinguish-
ing straight motion from curved motion34—it is exactly for this reason that
absolute space has empirical consequences, according to Newton. As any affine
connection grounds a distinction between geodesics and non-geodesics, this
suggests adding at least one affine connection to obtain the following stronger
criterion:
Although these properties are jointly sufficient for the concept, say spacetime, to apply, they are
not jointly nor even individually necessary—but, in order to avoid triviality, they are disjunctively
necessary in the sense that at least some of the properties must obtain in order for the concept
to apply. (Note that understanding spacetime as such a cluster concept, rather than insisting on
a set of criteria that is both jointly necessary and sufficient, immediately suggests that we should
not expect every (logically possible) object to fall into exactly one of two categories, spacetime or
matter [24, §7].) This paper does not intend to give an exhaustive list of properties that might
count toward the concept of spacetime applying. It merely aims to include one set of criteria that
is jointly sufficient for something being spacetime—a set of criteria that applies to Φ in particular
(as well as to the metric in GR).
33For instance, neither superspace [75] nor discrete ‘spacetimes’ satisfy these criteria, but we do
not believe that this suffices to rule them out as spacetimes.
34For simplicity’s sake, we are ignoring that strictly speaking one only needs a standard of
rotation, not a full standard of curved motion [78–80].
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Spacetime criterion M∇: The object under consideration is (faithfully rep-
resentable by) a (differentiable) manifold endowed with an affine connec-
tion.
But what about physical theories where a distinction between geodesic
and non-geodesic paths is not empirically significant, say theories for which
Leibnizian space(time) would be a sufficiently rich space(time)?
Moreover, objects that satisfy either of these two criteria (and feature in a
diffeomorphism invariant theory) seem to run up against the hole argument.35
Of course, one might attempt to avoid the hole argument using one of several
responses in the literature. For instance, it may be pointed out that Earman
and Norton assume primitive/fundamental transworld identities of the space-
time points, and that the hole argument dissolves if one strips these identities
away [81–84]. The objects that remain would still satisfy criterion M or M∇,
and therefore deserve the name ‘spacetime’. Moreover, even if the hole argu-
ment would go through, that would not imply that these two criteria are bad
criteria for denoting something as spacetime. For instance, in the context of
GR, it would merely imply that GR is best interpreted relationally, and there-
fore that spacetime is not fundamental—albeit still real.36 The hole argument
is thus not a reason against taking either of these two conditions as criteria for
being spacetime.
Some considerations that do pose a real problem turn out to arise even
prior to the introduction of matter dynamics,37 as was the case for the bucket
and hole arguments. Firstly, configuration spaces or phase spaces could also
satisfy the above two criteria. How to distinguish them from the type of space
that we are after? Secondly, these criteria do not distinguish n+1 dimensional
space from n+1 dimensional spacetime. Let us consider the following stronger
criterion:
Spacetime criterion M∇g: The object under consideration is (faithfully
representable by) a (differentiable) manifold with an affine connection,
plus a Lorentzian metric field38,39 on that manifold (which may or may
not be compatible with the connection).
This criterion is too strong, or rather something weaker will do the job of
distinguishing between two types of dimensions—and thus between space and
spacetime:
35The manifold substantivalism that Earman and Norton target uses criterion M explicitly, but
their argument would work equally well against a form of substantivalism that adds a connection.
36Of course, such a non-fundamental spacetime would not feature fundamental transworld iden-
tities either—but see Maunu [85].
37cf. [76, §9.3.2]
38For a more nuanced position, see Dewar & Eisenthal [86], who argue for a middle way between
bare-manifold and manifold-plus-metric accounts of spacetime.
39Of course the topological and differentiable structure and a fortiori the connection mentioned
in the first two spacetime criteria also require a metric in order to be defined, namely a metric
on the space of coordinates, but that metric is in general not the same metric as the metric field
living on the manifold. For instance, in GR the topology is induced from a Euclidean metric on
the space of coordinates, but has a Lorentzian metric living on the manifold. We are grateful to
Tushar Menon for pointing this out.
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Spacetime criterion M∇C: The object under consideration is (faithfully
representable by) a (differentiable) manifold with an affine connection,
plus a Lorentzian conformal structure, i.e. an equivalence class of Lorentzian
metrics, on that manifold.
Conformal structure suffices to distinguish between space and spacetime—it
distinguishes two types of dimensions, one usually referred to as temporal, the
other as spatial—while affine structure suffices to distinguish between geodesic
and non-geodesic paths through spacetime.
One problem that remains is that we do not know how to distinguish an
n+1 spacetime from a 1+n spacetime. For instance, why do we take fourdi-
mensional spacetimes to have one temporal dimension and three spatial di-
mensions, rather than the other way round? Is it simply essential to time that
it is a single dimension, and essential to space that it may have multiple di-
mensions? But where would this leave 1+1 spacetimes? Or is the distinction
between space and time less relevant in such a context—after all, GR in two
dimensions exhibits a cornucopia of pecularities [27]?
A further problem arises. Reference to the metric (or conformal structure)
in some of the above criteria is ambiguous, as there may be more than one. For
one thing, one can always just define extra metrics, such as Finsler metrics.
One might respond that the above criteria implicitly refer to the metrics that
are fundamental within the theory under consideration, that is metrics that
are postulated as part of the fundamental ontology of the theory. This would
however rule out, by fiat, mainstream positions such as relationalism—which
is a realist but non-fundamentalist position about spacetime—as well as the
dynamical approach to special relativity [21]. It would also be very much
against the spirit of spacetime functionalism. Even if we were to take this route,
we would expect the problem of multiple metrics to resurface in some theories
of modified gravity/spacetime—where we might expect the modification to
generate a second effective metric—and explicitly in bimetric theories, where
both metrics are part of the fundamental ontology. Application of spacetime
criterion M∇g (and in some cases also criterion M∇C) would then suggest that
this theory exhibits two spacetimes, which both share the same differentiable
manifold, but consist of a different metric. It seems a sensible restriction on the
concept of spacetime that there can be at most one spacetime in each model of
a theory at each level of description. Worries similar to those about multiple
metrics apply to theories with multiple affine connections, and even in theories
with just one metric and one affine connection if those are not compatible. In
the latter case, it is ambiguous whether a trajectory (say of a test particle) is
a geodesic, as it may be an affine geodesic but not a metric geodesic, or vice
versa.
Furthermore, we still have not managed to distinguish configuration and
phase spaces from the space(time) that we are after. (Imposing that the metric
(or conformal structure) be dynamic would certainly rule out configuration
space and phase space, but at the cost of denying Special Relativity the status
of a spacetime theory.) The reason is that the criteria so far talk only of
abstract, mathematical objects but have not made any connection with physics,
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that is with the (observable) behaviour of matter [58, p.12] [12, esp. p.89].40
Perhaps by moving from mathematics to physics we can thereby also resolve
the impasse arising from spacetime and configuration space being representable
by the same type of mathematical object.
3.2 Physical (spacetime) criteria
We have come to the second and final subset of the spacetime criteria, the
physical criteria. ‘Physical’ is meant to oppose ‘merely mathematical’, not
to be synonymous to ‘material’, a mistaken equivocation that often occurs in
the context of the matter criteria (cf. fn.15). These criteria take into account
the connection between spacetime and matter. The first advantage that this
connection provides is that it allows us to distinguish between n+1 and 1+n
spacetimes:
Cauchy (spacetime) criterion: A Lorentzian signature separates the di-
mensions into two types. The dimension(s) with respect to which a well-
defined initial value problem can be formulated—for the matter ‘living
in’ that spacetime and the dynamics governing that matter—form(s) the
temporal type; the other dimensions are of the spatial type. [88]
In practice, this ensures that there is typically one temporal and n spatial
dimensions, for multiple time dimensions would make a well-defined initial
value problem all but impossible (pace Weinstein [89]).
Two further criteria concern the connection between spacetime and matter.
In response to the question of what reasons we have to believe that GR can
be interpreted as geometrising the gravitational field—which we take to be
equivalent to gravity becoming part of spacetime in GR—one might give a
two-part answer.41 First, in GR we can describe gravity solely in terms of
the structure of spacetime.42 Secondly, in GR gravitationally charged (i.e.
massive) test particles move on the timelike geodesics of the connection (which
is compatible with the metric) even in the presence of gravity, and lights rays
move on the null geodesics of the same connection.43 Our second physical
criterion is thus:
40One may thus wish to call the spacetime candidates in this subsection ‘theoretical spacetimes’
and such spacetimes that furthermore satisfy the physical criteria in the next subsection the ‘phys-
ical spacetimes’ or ‘operational spacetimes’. It is however important to distinguish this usage
from the usage by Read and Menon, for whom both the concepts of theoretical and operational
spacetime refer to the dynamics of matter [87].
41See [76, Chapter 9] for details, and the inspiration for the weak geodesic criterion below,
applied to the question of whether the gravitational field in GR, as well as both the gravitational
and electromagnetic field in Weyl’s theory and in Kaluza-Klein theories, can be interpreted as an
aspect of spacetime structure.
42One might not describe geometrised forces in terms of curvature (only), but in terms of other
structures, such as metric and affine properties, and those deriving from them, like torsion and
con-torsion, or even topological ones [16,90].
43Note that Einstein opposed the idea that any of this means that gravity is reducible to the
geometry of spacetime; see Lehmkuhl [22] for details.
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Strong geodesic (spacetime) criterion: For any choice of initial condi-
tions, if test particles (and massive bodies that can be idealised as test
particles) were around, then they would all follow the time-like geodesics
of the same affine connection or metric whose null geodesics light rays
would follow if they were around.
It is often simply assumed that in GR the Levi-Civita connection fulfils
this criterion.44 And because this connection also gives rise to the curvature
tensor that features on the left-hand side of the gravitational field equations,
and is compatible to the metric tensor that solves these field equations, it is
possible to interpret GR as showing that the gravitational potential gµν is
part of spacetime structure. If one does not want to assume that that test
particles move on timelike geodesics, then different geodesic theorems (one of
which we discuss below) allow one to derive that they do. When it comes to
deriving the assertion that light rays move on null geodesics, then the choice
between possible ways of deriving this is much more limited; the most common
argument procceds via the geometrical-optical limit of GR, which is far from
having the status of a theorem.45
This might lead one to demand a weakened version of the geodesic crite-
rion, one that remains agnostic on whether light rays do indeed move on null
geodesics:
Weak geodesic (spacetime) criterion: For any choice of initial conditions,
if test particles (and massive bodies that can be idealised as test particles)
were around, then they would all follow the geodesics of the same affine
connection or metric.
For this criterion the distinction between timelike and null is not relevant
anymore.
But note that though this criterion is weaker, we are here searching not
for necessary conditions for something to be a spacetime or part of spacetime
structure; the array of generalizations of pseudo-Riemannian geometry that
arose after GR is far too rich for that, and each such generalization, with its
multiple curvature tensors, torsion, contorsion and non-metricity tensors, is
in principle a candidate for a way spacetime could be.46 For our purposes,
designed to tell whether a newly introduced field in superfluid dark matter
theory counts as part of spacetime structure, a sufficient condition is enough.
And here the stronger condition, the strong geodesic criterion, seems to provide
for the more cautious path.
One tentative possibility for a jointly sufficient (albeit not necessary) set
of criteria for something to be interpretable as spacetime would then be the
44See e.g. [91], p.120-121.
45Note, however, that Geroch and Weatherall’s approach [92] towards deriving geodesic motion,
which relies on a new mathematical concept they call “tracking”, allows to derive the assertion
that bodies constructed from wave packets of Maxwell fields ‘track’ null geodesics. They argue
(p.626) that this result ‘reflects’ the result normally gained via the geometric-optical limit, namely
that light rays move on null geodesics, in a precise way.
46See [73], section 2.1, for an overview of such structures, many of which were tried out as
candidate spacetimes in the context of unified field theories.
18
following: it must adhere to spacetime criterion M∇C, such that the Cauchy
criterion is satisfied and test particles and light rays follow the geodesics of
its metric or connection. This solves our problems of multiple metrics, multi-
ple connections and incompatible connections and metrics: the unique object
whose geodesics are followed by test particles and light rays is the object that
is part of spacetime. If a theory modifies spacetime/gravity in such a way that
test particles and light rays would follow the geodesics of this novel, modified,
effective metric, one may say that particles moving ‘under the influence’ of this
modification are forcefree. Thus, when there is a candidate modified/effective
metric, we can determine whether this is the physically relevant metric by
checking whether test particles and light rays would follow the geodesics of
this modified object (or rather the geodesics of the connection compatible
with that new metric) rather than those of the standard metric posited by the
theory.
However, the above proposal is incomplete, as a final important physical
spacetime criterion remains, which we might call the chronogeometricity cri-
terion or the Strong Equivalence Principle [93]. We need not only ensure that
test particles and light rays survey (the geodesics of) the metric or connection,
but also that the (luminous) matter from which one may construct rods and
clocks couples to the (same) metric or connection in the right way. That is,
there should be no (non-negligible) curvature terms appearing in the dynamical
equations which would prevent those rods and clocks from functioning prop-
erly, i.e. from behaving, locally, as they would in special relativity: exhibiting
time dilation, length contraction, etc.
Chronogeometricity (spacetime) criterion: The Strong Equivalence Prin-
ciple is satisfied, i.e. Special Relativity is locally valid, i.e. there are no
non-negligible curvature terms in the local equations of motion.47
A more demanding set of jointly sufficient criteria for an object to be inter-
pretable as part of spacetime structure, and the one we will work with in the
following, is then that the object is defined on a manifold fulfilling spacetime
criterion M∇C, such that the ‘constraints’ on matter ‘living in’ that spacetime,
as described by the Cauchy, strong geodesic and chronogeometricity criteria,
are satisfied.48 Note that if all of these conditions are imposed together, then
the metric and curvature tensor referred to in the chronometricity criterion
need to be those compatible with the metric referred to in the geodesic crite-
ria. If there were no further geometric structures defined on the manifold, then
this would imply that the conformal and affine structure referred to in crite-
rion M∇C would be compatible with one another. This in turn means that the
part of spacetime structure that is surveyed by rods, clocks, test particles and
light rays needs to be either (effectively) pseudo-Riemannian or Weylian.49 Of
47For more precise definitions, see [93,94].
48Arguably there is one additional relevant criterion: one needs independent reasons to believe
that the dimensionality of the manifold matches the dimensionality of physical spacetime. Without
this additional constraint, the 5-dimensional metric of a Kaluza-Klein theory would satisfy all the
criteria in the main text, even though it is arguably the 4-dimensional metric that one obtains from
projecting the 5-dimensioal metric into four dimensions that corresponds to physical space [76].
49See [95] for a proof to that effect.
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course, that seems to restrict the set of allowed spacetime structures at first
sight. But note again that we are not saying that all these conditions have to
be fullfilled for something to be a spacetime or an aspect of spacetime struc-
ture; we only say that if they are fullfilled, then the object in question can be
interpreted as part of spacetime structure.
With the matter and spacetime criteria in hand, it is time to turn to our
case study, superfluid dark matter theory (SFDM), and see how the newly
introduced field of the theory fares in light of our criteria—and how the criteria
fare in light of the physics.
4 ‘Superfluid Dark Matter theory’ (SFDM)
Theories labeled as dark matter theories have traditionally done well at the
level of cosmology and galaxy clusters, but less so at the level of galaxies.
The opposite is the case for theories labeled as modifications of gravity and/or
spacetime. A promising approach to breaking this stalemate is to find a single
novel entity for which there is a natural, physical, dynamical reason why it
behaves like DM on large scales and like MG on galactic scales. In this respect
it is relevant to note that to mediate a long-range force in galaxies, a mass-
less messenger (force carrier) is needed. A natural candidate presents itself:
the quantised soundwaves of a superfluid, i.e. phonons, which are Goldstone
bosons and thus massless. In the Standard Model of Particle Physics, matter
(in the broad sense used in this paper) is divided into bosonic force carriers
and fermionic matter (in a narrower sense of matter).50 But there is no rea-
son why matter, in this narrow sense, could not also be bosonic, and it is not
uncommon for new dark matter theories to postulate a bosonic dark matter
field. If the associated particles self-interact (repulsively), they can form a
superfluid Bose-Einstein condensate (BEC), which carries phonons. In other
words, in this phase one cannot associate with the field a set of individual
(nearly) collisionless particles; it is best described in terms of collective exci-
tations. If these phonons cohere they can mediate a long-range force. If the
phonons are described by the appropriate Lagrangian, they mediate a MOND-
ian force. In order for the superfluid BEC phase to obtain, the De-Broglie
wavelength of the Φ-particles needs to be larger than the mean interparticle
separation [30, p.5] [96, §2.2] (or equivalently, the associated temperature needs
to be below a critical value). In order for the phonons to cohere the BEC needs
to be allowed sufficient time to thermalise [30, p.5-6]. If parameters are cho-
sen such that those two conditions obtain only in galaxies, but not at larger
scales, this would provide a natural reason for why the MONDian behaviour
of the single novel entity appears only in galaxies. This approach to resolving
the dark phenomenon stalemate is created and developed by Berezhiani and
Khoury, under the name ‘Superfluid Dark Matter Theory’. We will outline the
original version of their theory [29, 30] in this section.
This theory postulates a self-interacting, massive, complex scalar field Φ
50We are excluding the Higgs boson here, since, although it is a boson, it is not associated with
one of the four fundamental forces.
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with global U(1) symmetry, via the following term:
LΦ = −
1
2
(
|∂µΦ|
2 +m2|Φ|2
)
−
Λ4
6(Λ2c + |Φ|
2)6
(
|∂µΦ|
2 +m2|Φ|2
)3
(3)
with Λc and Λ two constants introducing two mass/energy scales.
51 (The main
justification for this choice of Lagrangian comes from reverse engineering: it is
this Lagrangian that will ultimately reproduce MOND in the Galactic regime,
as discussed below.)
Spontaneous symmetry breaking of the global U(1) symmetry yields, in the
non-relativistic regime, the following Lagrangian for the associated Goldstone
bosons—these massless phonons being represented by the scalar field θ, the
phase of Φ = ρei(θ+mt):
LT=0,¬rel,θ =
2Λ(2m)3/2
3
X
√
|X |, (4)
with
X ≡ θ˙ −mΦ−
(~∇θ)2
2m
, (5)
where Φ is now interpreted as the external gravitational potential. (This iden-
tification receives its justification when one derives this non-relativistic descrip-
tion from the relativistic description, i.e. Eq.(6), with g˜ = g˜SFDM as given by
Eq.(8).) To lowest order in the derivatives, superfluid phonons are in general
described by a scalar field θ governed by a Lagrangian L = P (X), with X given
by Eq.(5) [30, p.3] [97]. The specific choice of P given by Eq.(4) uniquely de-
termines the specific type of superfluid, namely one that interacts primarily
through three-body interactions, i.e. with an equation of state P ∝ ρ3.
The interaction between the phonons and the regular (i.e. luminous) mat-
ter fields is then added to this Lagrangian as an “empirical term” [30, p.8]
(as opposed to being derived from an interaction term in the fundamental La-
grangian). In the relativistic regime we may describe this via the metric g˜µν ,
sometimes referred to as the physical metric—whether such metrics deserve
this name will be discussed in §5.2—because all luminous-matter fields couple
universally to this metric (and to the Einstein metric gµν only indirectly, via
this physical metric):52
L rel, int = L(g˜µν , ψ
α, ψα;µ|g˜) (6)
with ψα the luminous-matter fields, and ψα;µ|g˜ denoting the covariant derivative
with respect to g˜. The physical metric of SFDM is inspired by that of TeVeS.
TeVeS, a theory usually referred to as a modification of gravity, postulates
two new dynamical fields—a real scalar field φ and a 4-vector field Aµ—which,
together with the Einstein metric gµν , constitute the effective metric g˜
TV S
µν .
This physical metric is disformally related to the Einstein metric [31] [99,
51Λc ensures that the theory admits a Φ = 0 vacuum [30, p.15].
52 In a later paper [98], photons are not coupled to the effective metric, but to the Einstein
metric. Some conclusions reached in §5.2 do not apply to that alternative version of the SFDM
theory. (See also the end of Section 7 of the sequel paper [24].)
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§3.4]. That is, it does not stretch the Einstein metric equally in all directions,
which would leave all angles and thus shapes invariant, as with a conformal
transformation, but instead stretches it by a factor of e−2φ in the directions
orthogonal to Aµ ≡ gµνAν while shrinking it by the same factor in the direction
parallel toAµ, where the Sanders 4-vector field Aµ is unit-time-like with respect
to the Einstein metric (gµνAµAν = −1) [31, 99, 100]:
g˜TV Sµν = e
− 2αΛ
MPl
φ
(gµν +AµAν)− e
2αΛ
MPl
φ
AµAν
= e
− 2αΛ
MPl
φ
gµν − 2AµAνsinh(
2αΛ
MPl
φ)
≈ gµν −
2αΛ
MPl
φ(gµν + 2AµAν),
(7)
with MPl the Planck mass and α a dimensionless coupling constant.
SFDM modifies TeVeS in two ways: one semantic and one syntactic modi-
fication. The semantic revision is to not add yet another (vector) field, but to
identify the four-vector Aµ with the unit four-velocity uµ of the (normal fluid
component [24, §5.3.3] of the) previously added scalar field Φ. Syntactically,
the TeVeS factor of 2 is generalised to obtain:
g˜SFDMµν ≈ gµν −
2αΛ
MPl
θ (γgµν + (1 + γ)uµuν) , (8)
with TeVeS being recovered for γ = 1 (and a metric conformally related to gµν
for γ = −1).
The full relativistic form may be used to calculate gravitational lensing
effects. In the context of recovering the galaxy rotation curve component of
the dark phenomena we only require the non-relativistic approximation:
L¬rel,int = −α
Λ
MPl
θρb, (9)
where ρb is the baryon density. The total effective, non-relativistic Lagrangian
can then be shown to reproduce [30, p.10-11], under suitable approxima-
tions (such as θ being static and spherically symmetric), the MONDian result
aMOND =
√
a0
GMb(r)
r2 for a baryonic particle with mass Mb, after identifica-
tion of a0 =
α3Λ2
MPl
.
To a particle physicist, the fractional power of X (Eq.4), 3/2, although
required if one aims to eventually regain MONDian behaviour [30, §IV], might
seem strange—it is, for instance, less straightforward to draw corresponding
Feynman diagrams. In condensed matter theory, such powers are far from
rare. As mentioned, this specific fractional power corresponds to a phonon
superfluid, with equation of state P ∝ ρ3.
Superfluidity only occurs at sufficiently low temperature. This naturally
distinguishes between galaxies and galaxy clusters. Due to the smaller veloc-
ities in galaxies,53 the superfluid description is appropriate there,54 exactly
53Given a mass m and density ρ [30, Eqs. 8 & 80].
54Since the local phonon gradient induced by the Sun is too large to satisfy the criteria for a
superfluid Bose-Einstein condensate, the condensate loses its coherence, which allows SFDM to
avoid solar system constraints [30, §V].
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Object Theory Matter strength
Newtonian spacetime Newtonian Gravity – (static)
Minkowski spacetime Special Relativity – (static)
Non-trivial gµν General Relativity D (action-reaction) or
E (E in region)
Photon Standard Model G (Tµν)
Electron Standard Model H (mass)
Scalar field Φ Superfluid Dark Matter H (mass) (or G (Tµν))
Table 1: Application of the matter criteria to the case study and to other familiar
objects that provide a contrast.
where MOND is successful. In the clusters the velocity/ temperature is too
high, and one finds either a mixture of the superfluid and normal phase, or
only the normal phase, suggesting that the theory might exemplify the usual
successes of dark matter theories at that level.
5 Is SFDM a Theory of Dark Matter or of Mod-
ified Gravity/Spacetime?
Having introduced the two families of matter and spacetime criteria, as well as
SFDM with its novel complex scalar field Φ, we are finally in the position to ask
the main question: which label(s)—dark matter or modified gravity/spacetime,
or both, or neither—does this new field Φ within SFDM deserve? In this
section we first evaluate Φ with respect to the matter criteria (Subsection 5.1)
and subsequently with respect to the spacetime criteria (Subsection 5.2).
5.1 Matter evaluation of SFDM
The matter criteria have been put forward, in their various strengths, as nec-
essary and/or sufficient conditions for something to be matter. Before using
them to evaluate Φ, let us briefly rank some familiar objects, in order to eventu-
ally provide contrast with Φ. Newtonian spacetime and Minkowski spacetime
satisfy none of the matter criteria, and would thus, as expected, be consid-
ered not to be matter (Table 1). A paradigmatic matter field such as that
of the electron in Quantum Electrodynamics satisfies all matter criteria up to
strength H. A photon satisfies up to exactly criterion G. Remember that we are
in the business of distinguishing matter from spacetime, not stable (fermionic)
matter from (bosonic) force carriers between that matter—we are grouping the
latter together with matter in this paper. As hinted at before, the strongest
criterion (H) thus seems to be overkill; at most criterion G should be sufficient
for labeling something matter. Depending on how much one lowers the bar for
sufficiency the metric field in GR might also be considered matter according to
these criteria. Regardless of where the bar lies exactly, the scalar field added
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in Berezhiani and Khoury’s Superfluid Dark Matter Theory (SFDM), satisfy-
ing even the strongest criterion, would definitely count as matter, making it a
Dark Matter theory as their choice of name suggests! One issue though is that
it may be unclear, especially in the context of our case study, what is meant
exactly by having mass. Particle physicists may equate mass to the pole of the
propagator. In gravitational physics, the total mass of a gravitating system
like a star or a black hole is defined as its Komar, ADM or Bondi mass, which
include contributions both from the gravitational binding energy holding the
star (say) together, and from the matter fields that make it shine. However,
these three conceptions of mass don’t necessarily coincide, and can only be de-
fined in special spacetimes.55 Nevertheless, this has not prevented condensed
matter physicists, whose discipline inspired core elements of SFDM, from using
the concept of mass.
That being said, it is also true that there are regions within galaxies where
the mass-energy-momentum associated with Φ plays a subdominant or even
negligible role in accounting for the (MONDian) behaviour of luminous matter
in galaxies. The explanatory story can then be told (almost) fully in terms of
effective metrics. Moreover, even Rovelli admits that, although the metric field
in GR has adopted most of the classic properties of matter, this “is not to say
that the gravitational field is exactly the same object as any other field. The
very fact that it admits an interpretation in geometrical terms witnesses to its
peculiarity” [8, p.194]. Before passing judgement it therefore seems advisable
to turn to the second family of criteria popular in the literature, the spacetime
criteria.
5.2 Spacetime evaluation of SFDM
In this subsection we evaluate the SFDM scalar field Φ according to the space-
time criteria. Crucial to this discussion will be the fact that in SFDM, within
the superfluid regime, normal matter (i.e. luminous, non-dark matter) ‘feels’
the effective metric g˜SFDMµν —built up out of the Einstein metric and the SFDM
scalar field—instead of just the Einstein metric gµν . For, in that regime,
Llum−mat is a function of g˜
SFDM
µν and of covariant derivatives with respect
to that effective metric (Eq.6), rather than a function of gµν and of covariant
derivatives with respect to that Einstein metric:56,57
Llum−mat = L(g˜
SFDM
µν , ψ
α, ψα;µ|g˜SFDM ). (10)
Let us start with the ‘strong geodesic criterion’. We first turn to test
particles, followed by a discussion of the behaviour of light rays. According to
55Both the ADM mass and the Bondi mass rely on approximating the spacetime containing the
star or black hole as asymptotically flat, and rely on the resulting Killing symmetries to define
the total mass of the body in question. The Bondi mass is defined via asymptotic symmetries
at spatial infinity, the ADM mass via those at null infinity. The Komar mass does not demand
asymptotic flatness but stationarity, and so here too Killing symmetries do much of the work of
defining a concept of mass.
56See fn.52.
57We assume the simplest possible case, i.e. minimal coupling and only first order derivatives of
the matter fields, which is typical for a matter Lagrangian.
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SFDM, do massive test particles (of luminous matter)58 follow geodesics, and
if so, the geodesics of which metric? The Einstein metric? The effective SFDM
metric? A different metric altogether? Let us recall the geodesic theorem by
Geroch and Jang [101]. Suppose that given any open subset O of manifold M
with metric g′µν containing a curve γ, there exists a smooth, symmetric field
T µν with the following properties:
1. T µν satisfies the strengthened dominant energy condition, i.e. given any
timelike vector ξµ at any point in M , T µνξµξν ≥ 0, and either T
µν = 0
or T µνξν is timelike;
59
2. T µν satisfies the conservation condition, i.e. ∇νT
µν = 0, where the co-
variant derivatives are with respect to g′µν ;
3. supp(T µν) ⊂ O; and
4. there is at least one point in O at which T µν 6= 0.
Then γ is a timelike curve that may be reparametrized as a geodesic.
The paths of test particles are supposed to correspond to γ in virtue of
condition 4, whereby the non-vanishing of T µν is taken as corresponding to
the presence of a massive test particle. However, note that there is no further
requirement that T µν be the stress-energy-momentum tensor, though it needs
to be a second-rank tensor that can be interpreted as an indicator of the
presence of matter in order to use the theorem for making predictions about
the presence of matter. The theorem was further generalized by Geroch and
Ehlers [102] and by Geroch and Weatherall [92], but for our purposes the
original Geroch-Jang theorem suffices.60
Our question now becomes: for which metric g′µν within SFDM does the
geodesic theorem hold? In particular, with respect to (the covariant derivatives
associated with) which metric is T µν conserved? For that is condition 2 of the
Geroch-Jang theorem, and drives much of the proof of the theorem, telling us
on the geodesics of which metric test particles move. To that end, recall the
following further result. Consider any matter field, describable by an action
that is a function (only) of that field, some metric g′µν and covariant derivatives
of that field with respect to that metric. If that action is required to be
diffeomorphism invariant, it can be shown that there exists a rank-2 tensor
Tµν associated with that matter field which is symmetric, vanishes in open
regions only if the field configuration (satisfying the field equations) vanishes
there,61 and which is covariantly conserved with respect to g′µν (in virtue of
the matter field equations holding) [105, p.64–67] [106, p.456].
58We are here not considering test matter made out of Φ, but see the section on breakdown
interpretations in the sequel paper [24].
59Though the metric does not explicitly appear in the definition of the strengthenend dominant
energy condition, the latter nevertheless can only be defined with reference to at least conformal,
if not metric, structure. See [23, §5.2] for details.
60See also [103] for further discussion of the Geroch-Jang theorem and its conditions and appli-
cations, and [104] for arguments why Einstein preferred a different type of geodesic theorem.
61As long as the Lagrangian density vanishes only where the field (satisfying the field equations)
does and has non-trivial dependence on the metric (configuration satisfying the field equations for
that metric).
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The luminous-matter part of the SFDM action (applicable to the superfluid
regime) has exactly the required form, with g′µν = g˜
SFDM
µν (Eq.10). From
the requirement of diffemorphism invariance of this action, one thus obtains
a symmetric rank-2 tensor Tµν which, under the additional assumption of it
satisfying the strengthened dominant energy condition, satisfies the geodesic
theorem with respect to gSFDMµν . Thus, within the superfluid regime, test
particles (of luminous matter) in SFDM follow the timelike geodesics of the
effective metric gSFDMµν ! The SFDM scalar field modifies the behaviour of those
test particles, in the sense that they do not follow the timelike geodesics of the
Einstein metric, as they do in GR, but instead those of an effective metric built
up out of the Einstein metric and that SFDM scalar field.
To determine the behaviour of light rays in SFDM, the most standard way
would be to consider the geometrical-optical limit of electromagnetic fields de-
fined on an SFDM spacetime. As of yet, no-one has worked this out in any
detail. However, what drives the argument that light rays move on null geode-
scis in the context of GR is that one assumes minimal coupling between the
metric and the electromagnetic field, i.e. replaces the partial derivatives in the
Maxwell equations by covariant derivatives, where the covariant derivative is
compatible with the metric that solves the gravitaional field equations, and
with the help of which the curvature tensor featuring in the field equations is
defined. One then derives the wave equation for the electromagnetic vector
potential on a curved background, which features a contraction of said curva-
ture tensor. Then one solves this wave equation approximately by introducing
a parameter ǫ that tracks how rapidly various terms approach zero or infin-
ity in said approximation,62 and then observes that looking at terms of order
O(1ǫ ) and O(
1
ǫ2 ) one can derive that in that limit, where electromagnetic waves
can be approximated as (light) rays, the light rays move on null geodesics of
the connection. Now, if one assumes that in the SFDM context the partial
derivatives occuring in the Maxwell equations on flat spacetime should be re-
placed by covariant derivatives with respect to the effective metric g˜µν from
Eq.8 (cf. Eq.10), then it seems plausible that one could make an analogous
argument in the context of SFDM.63 If this is true, then light rays in SFDM
would follow geodesics of the effective metric g˜µν .
The effective metric in SFDM (plus Maxwell) would then be as spatiotem-
poral as the Einstein metric in GR (plus Maxwell) as far as the behaviour of
light rays is concerned.
Finally, we move to the chronogeometricity criterion.64 To determine the
62See e.g. [107], p.570-577 for details.
63However, note that the curvature tensor derived from g˜µν would contain the phase of the newly
introduced superfluid field, θ, as well as the velocity vector field uµ of its normal fluid component.
Since part of the assumption that goes into the above approximation scheme is that the ‘typical
reduced wavelength’ of the electromagnetic waves is small compared to the ‘typical component of
the Riemann tensor in a typical Lorentz frame’, it could be that the more complicated curvature
tensor gets in the way of imposing these conditions.
64Berezhiani, Khoury and Famaey [98] assert that MOND, and by extension SFDM, violates
the ‘strong equivalence principle’. It is clear though that what they refer to as (an implication
of) the ‘strong equivalence principle’, namely that “a homogeneous acceleration has no physical
consequence” [98, p.14] (which would indeed be contradicted by MOND’s acceleration scale a0), is
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local validity of Special Relativity, we need to determine whether any curvature
terms pop up in the equations of motions of the luminous matter (that makes
up rods and clocks). To this end, compare the way luminous matter is coupled
universally to the Einstein metric gµν within General relativity,
Llum−mat−in−GR = Llum−mat(gµν , ψ
α, ψα;µ|gµν ) (11)
with the way in which the direct analogue of that Lagrangian term would be
included in (the superfluid regime of) SFDM, that is by a universal coupling to
the SFDM metric, Eq.10. As the matter equations are determined by varying
Slum−mat, which has the same form for both theories except for the role of the
metric being played by different tensors, these equations of motions also have
the same form except for any potential curvature terms being with respect do
different metric tensors (i.e. gµν and g˜
SFDM
µν respectively). Strict satisfaction
of the chronogeometricity criterion would require there to be no curvature
terms at all in the local equations of motions of the luminous matter fields ψα.
It turns out however that that not only non-minimal coupling can generate
curvature terms [21, §9.4.1], but that even minimal coupling can do so [93,106],
thereby strictly violating the chronogeometricity criterion. The approximate
validity of the criterion then depends on whether one can effectively ignore
the curvature terms in the specific experimental or operational context one is
interested in. In a general sense, the effective metric in the context of SFDM is
thus not worse off than the Einstein metric in the context of GR when it comes
to satisfying the chronogeometricity criterion. Within each theory one would
have to check, for each solution and for (each neighbourhood of) each event
in that solution, whether the curvature term (with respect to the respective
metric) is sufficiently small to provide Special Relativity up to the required
approximation.
In conclusion, as far as the (strong) geodesic and chronogeometricity criteria
are concerned, the effective SFDM metric, constructed out of the Einstein
metric and the new SFDM scalar field, satisfies them, within the superfluid
regime, to the same extent that the Einstein metric does within GR. If the
Einstein metric within GR deserves to be labeled ‘spacetime’, so would the
SFDM scalar deserve to be labeled an ‘aspect’ or ‘modification’ of spacetime.
6 Conclusion & Outlook
Let us sum up where that leaves us so far. The scalar field Φ introduced by
SFDM satisfies the matter criterion of (almost) the highest strength. Regard-
less of where one draws the line, that is which matter strength one considers
sufficient for something being matter, the scalar field Φ will clearly count as a
matter field. We have also seen that, at least within the superfluid regime, the
SFDM effective metric, constructed out of the Einstein metric and Φ, satisfies
the spacetime criteria to the same extent as the Einstein metric does within
GR. Φ is thus—at least for temperatures below the critical temperature for
not what we have defined as the strong equivalence principle. We would call this a version of the
Einstein equivalence principle [94].
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superfluidity—also as much of an aspect of spacetime as one can expect of a
dynamical field.
The significance of this result becomes clear when we contrast it with a pre-
vious attempt by Khoury to account for dark phenomena [108]. That theory
adds not one but two scalar fields. According to Khoury, the first scalar field
“behaves as a dark matter fluid on large scales” [108, p.1]. The second “me-
diates a fifth force that modifies gravity on nonlinear scales” [108, p.1]. Even
if these quotes hold up under the interpretations offered by our families of cri-
teria, it would be one field being responsible for satisfying one or more of the
matter criteria, and the other field being responsible for ticking off the space-
time criteria. This is neither novel nor especially interesting with respect to
the interpretational questions posed in our two companion papers: both within
(field-theoretic versions of) Newtonian physics and Special Relativity do the
metric fields satisfy the spacetime criteria (and none of the matter criteria)
and, say, electric charge density fields satisfy the matter criteria (and none of
the spacetime criteria). What is interesting about SFDM is that, rather than
requiring a second field, the modification of the metric is associated with a four-
velocity of the only new (scalar) field Φ which also plays the dark matter role;
the “DM and MOND [or Modified Gravity] components have a common origin,
representing different phases of a single underlying substance” [30, p.1,3].
The result of this paper still leaves open the interpretational questions men-
tioned at the beginning. What follows from this for the distinction between
dark matter and modified gravity, as well as the broader distinction between
matter and spacetime, both within SFDM and in general? Does the fact that
Φ seems to satisfy the spacetime criteria only below the critical temperature
for superfluidity imply that it is ‘more’ of a dark matter field than it is a mod-
ification of spacetime, or are both roles on a par? These and other remaining
interpretational questions will be the focus of the companion paper [24].
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